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Abstract 
The inherent safety intervention framework (ISIF) was developed to integrate the inherent safety level assessment methods to the 
process simulation tools. This framework is considered as a major breakthrough in the development of inherently safe design. In 
this framework, the best process route is selected by using the Process Route Index (PRI), and the inherent safety level of all process 
streams is estimated by using Process Stream Index (PSI). Moreover, the worst stream is identified on the basis of the highest 
magnitude of PSI. However, benchmarking of the worst stream is difficult to predict by using the original ISIF. In this work, a 
benchmarking criteria for a worst process stream is established through risk assessment. This reform could potentially improve the 
reliability of the original ISIF.  
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1. Introduction  
Inherently safer design (ISD) provides an opportunity to significantly reducing the hazards [1]. This method of risk 
analysis avoids hazards by reducing the amount of hazardous substance or operations in a plant rather than trying to 
mitigate them by adding external safety devices. ISD focuses on the effects of a single event such as fires, explosions 
and toxic releases on the environment, people, property and businesses. This method works by making the process 
itself less hazardous, but only to a stage so that the process or the design of the plant does not change. 
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The idea of ISD has been initiated a long time ago, but it has not been successfully integrated with the process 
design stages due to the lack of systematic methodology and technology. This issue was resolved by implementing 
the  Inherent Safety Intervention Framework (ISIF) [2]. This framework takes the structured approach of QRA and 
implements them at the early phases of the design to enable the assessment, control and reduction of risk as per the 
philosophies of inherent safety. 
 
ISIF is presented in Figure 1. The aim of this framework is to integrate the inherent safety level (ISL) assessment 
method with the process design simulation tools during the process route selection and the preliminary design stage. 
The first step of this framework is related to the selection of inherently safe chemical process route by using the 
Process Route Index (PRI)[3].  Inherent Risk Assessment (IRA) similar to Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is 
used to analyze the consequent impacts and frequency of credible event (explosion) in the selected process route [4]. 
Eventfully, the Process Stream Index (PSI) is implemented to analyze the ISL of the process streams in the selected 
process route at the preliminary design stage [5].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 1 Inherent safety intervention framework [2] 
 
In this framework, the PSI only sees the overall risk of each stream and prioritize them according to the ISL. The 
process stream having the highest magnitude of PSI can be considered as the worst one. Currently, the benchmarking 
of the worst process stream is lacking in the original ISIF. The main objective of this work is to enhance the reliability 
of ISIF by resolving this issue.  
2. Methodology 
The conceptual flow diagram of the enhanced ISIF is presented in Figure2. The probability of the consequent 
impacts and the frequency of a credible event are required for the estimation of risk. Fatalities, injuries and structural 
damage are considered as the potential consequent impacts, and an explosion is deliberated as a credible event in this 
framework. The risk acceptable criteria would be defined on the basis of the results of both parameters.  
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Fig. 2 Enhanced inherent safety intervention framework  
 
2.1Consequence Analysis 
 
The TNO multi energy model has been selected for the estimation of the consequent impacts resulted from the loss 
of containment of the worst stream. The flammable mass and explosion parameters would be required for the 
estimation of the potential damage.  
 
2.1.1Flammability estimation 
 
Flammability can be estimated by the difference of upper flammability limit (UFL) and lower flammability limit 
(LFL) respectively. UFL and LFL of the mixture can be estimated by the following equations.  
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2.1.2Flammable mass estimation  
 
Loss of containment scenario is considered under chock flow condition. The discharge rate under chock flow 
condition and flammable mass can be estimated by the following equations.  
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2.1.3 Estimation of explosion parameters  
 
The TNO multi energy correlation are used to estimate the explosion parameters. The explosion energy can be 
estimated from the following equations.  
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2.1.4 Estimation of the potential damage 
 
The fatalities, injuries and structure damage are considered as the possible consequent impact from the loss of 
containment of heat exchangers. The probit method can be implemented for analyzing these impacts [6]. The probit 
variable (Y) and probability (P) of these impacts can be computed from the following equations. 
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Fatalities, injuries and structural damages were deliberated as the possible consequences of vapor cloud explosions. 
Probit parameters values for these impacts are listed in the Table 1. The probit variable value can be converted to 
probability by using Eq. (11). 
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Table1 Probit correlation values of various impacts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
2.2 Frequency of credible events  
 
The frequency of explosion and fire can be estimated by using fault tree analysis (FTA) or event tree analysis 
(ETA) method. However, ETA can be preferred over FTA for estimating the frequency of fire and explosion scenarios 
due to its sequential behavior [4, 7]. Therefore, ETA method has been selected for estimating the frequency of 
explosion.  
3. Results and discussions 
Methyl methacrylate (MMA) routes are selected for demonstrating the implementation of enhanced ISIF. MMA 
can be produce by using four process routes. MMA manufacturing route through Tertiary Butyl Alcohol (TBA) is 
foundthe most inherently safe by implementing the most of inherent safety indices including Process Route index 
(PRI) [3]. Therefore, this route is selected for further analysis. The simulated PFD of this process is presented in 
Figure 3. Moreover, the inherent safety level of all process streams is estimated by applying the process stream index 
(PSI) and the process stream “FEED 3” is found the worst process stream.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Process Simulation diagram of MMA (TBA)  
 
PSI is estimated by using the following equation.  
ΔFLHvρP0 IIIIAPSI uuuu  
 
       (12) 
 
A0 is a constant, and it is used to increase or decrease the magnitude of the resulting numbers for the calculation of 
PSI. Its value depends on the units and the accepted magnitude is up to the acceptable level of the end user. Rest of 
Possible impacts  Causative variable k1 k2 
Death from lungs hemorrhage Ps -77.1 6.91 
Ear drum rupture Ps -15.6 1.93 
Structure damage Ps -23.8 2.92 
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the numbers are the dimensionless numbers. Pressure (P), density (ρ), heating value (Hv) and combustibility potential 
(∆FL) are required for the PSI estimation of each process stream. These numbers can be estimated by taking the ratio 
of that parameter for a specific process stream to the average value of that parameter in all process streams. The details 
of these dimensionless numbers are mentioned in the PSI [5]. The dimensionless number for a pressure can be 
estimated by the following equation. 
streams process  allfor  (P) of  valueAverage
stream process specific afor  (P) Presssure
Ip   
 
(13) 
 
The detailed PSI estimation for all the stream is presented in Table 2. Moreover, Ao constant value is selected as 
10 for this particular case. Process stream (FEED3) retains the maximum magnitude of PSI. Therefore, it can be 
considered as the worst stream.  
 
Table 2 Estimation of explosion parameters in original heat exchanger network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The consequent impacts and the frequency of explosion are estimated by considering the full bore rupture of the 
worst process stream (FFED3). Fatalities, injuries and structural damage are considered as the consequent impacts by 
loss of containment of FEED3. The estimated probabilities of each impact is presented in the Table 3.  
 
The exposure frequency can be estimated by using the Event Tree Analysis. Here, the initiating event is considered 
as explosion and the structural damage is considered as the final event. Since, safety instrumented functions are not 
established during the early stage of the design. Therefore, human failure scenario was considered as a pivotal event.  
The length and diameter of the pipe were selectedas 25 meters and 203mm respectively. The scenario is the full 
bore rupture of a FEED3 process pipeline.The exposure frequency can be estimated by the following equation.  
 
timelengthfrequency failure  base    Frequency  Explosure uu  
 
       (14) 
 
 
Process 
Stream 
IP Iρ IHv I∆FL PSI 
FEED1 1.14 0.01 1.77 0.24 0.07 
FEED2 1.14 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
FEED3 1.14 4.22 1.33 1.61 102.65 
FEED4 1.14 0.00 1.09 1.92 0.05 
FEED5 0.88 0.00 1.09 1.92 0.09 
FEED6 0.82 0.98 1.69 0.64 8.69 
FEED7 0.82 1.22 0.60 0.00 0.00 
FEED8 0.82 2.28 0.91 1.80 30.64 
FEED9 0.82 0.00 1.16 1.16 0.05 
FEED10 0.82 4.64 0.98 1.69 62.98 
FEED11 0.82 1.26 0.01 0.00 0.00 
FEED12 0.82 1.13 1.22 0.94 10.61 
FEED13 0.82 0.01 1.17 1.12 0.05 
FEED14 2.34 0.01 1.17 1.12 0.41 
FEED15 2.34 0.31 1.17 1.12 9.52 
FEED16 0.47 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 
FEED17 0.47 1.29 1.22 1.01 7.43 
FEED18 1.66 1.02 1.08 1.24 22.71 
FEED19 0.47 0.00 1.19 0.73 0.02 
FEED20 0.47 1.18 1.17 0.64 4.16 
FEED21 0.47 1.08 1.19 0.73 4.41 
FEED22 1.17 1.16 0.80 3.11 33.57 
FEED23 1.17 1.16 0.80 0.28 2.97 
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6-7 105.7125103 Frequency Explosure u uuu                           (15) 
 
Table3 Probability of consequent impacts  
 
 
The probability of injuries and structure damage is found considerably high by the catastrophic rupture of FEED3. 
However, the possibility of fatalities is found significantly low. Moreover, the exposure frequency of this leak case is 
insignificant. The risk of explosion would be significantly lower from the loss of containment of FEED3. Therefore, 
this route can be considered for detailed design.  
4. Conclusion  
In this work, the reliability of the inherent safety intervention framework (ISIF) has been extended by defining a 
benchmark criteria for a worst process stream. The enhanced inherent safety intervention framework is integrated with 
the process design simulator. It would reduce the time, manual tedious calculation and chances of error. This 
framework could potentially implement on a commercial scale for the inherent safety analysis of the process stream 
network.  
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PipeSize (mm) Release rate (Kg/hr) Selected Distance Over pressure (kPa) 
Estimated Probabilities 
Fatalities Injuries 
Structure 
Damage 
203 22601.9354  100 91.99703753 0.001 0.93 1.00 
